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Oliver H. Turnbull
Visuo-spatial neglect has long been thought of as a
disorder of attention, but a recent experiment shows
that, when images from the left side are reflected by a
mirror into the ‘good’ hemispace, neglect patients
behave as if the object were behind, or in, the mirror —
as if the left side of their world did not ‘exist’.
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Our modern and liberal society tries — politics aside — to
attach no special emotional value to the dimensions ‘left’
and ‘right’. We encourage our children to write with their
left hands if they find this preferable, and we wonder about
a world in which left-handedness could have been imbued
with such emotionally charged labels as ‘sinistral’, ‘gauche’
or ‘cack-handed’ — a world where the favoured sat on
God’s right side. There is, however, a neuropsychological
disorder in which the left–right dimension does take on a
strong differential importance and, as ever, the left side
tends to come off second best. In the disorder of ‘visuo-
spatial neglect’, discussed in more detail below, the left side
is ignored, and may be regarded in rather negative terms.
Understandably, then, the neglect patient’s attitude to
this side of space is of great interest to neuropsychol-
ogists — hence the interest in a recent experiment by
Ramachandran and colleagues [1]. Using a mirror, they
were able to examine what happens when a neglect
patient is inadvertently required to gaze directly upon the
left side — a side towards which they hold such remark-
able inclinations. Their bizarre responses tell us some-
thing of the way in which we deal with contradictions of
experience, and also reveal a central theoretical issue
about the nature of the disorder of ‘neglect’.
The Ramachandran et al. paper [1] describes four patients
who suffer from a disorder known as unilateral hemispatial
neglect. This neuropsychological deficit occurs most com-
monly and severely in patients with right hemisphere
lesions, and involves a failure to attend to objects located
to their left side (see [2] for review). Such patients draw
only the right half of the flower they are copying, eat food
only from the right half of the plate, and shave or apply
lipstick only to the right half of their face. Is the disorder
caused by a failure to ‘see’ the left half of the world? Cer-
tainly, there are disorders in which the patient is truly
‘blind’ for a visual half-field (hemianopia). However, the
disorder of neglect does not follow from an inability to
‘see’ one half of the visual world — there are patients who
have neglect but no hemianopia, and patients who have
hemianopia but no neglect [3], with the two disorders
following from brain lesions at different sites.
What, then, is the nature of the disorder in cases of
neglect? It is clear that, at least some of the time, such
patients can see things on their left — if the object attracts
their attention, perhaps by moving or flashing brightly. In
practice, however, they are seldom aware of the left half of
their world. The currently accepted interpretation of their
deficit is that the attentional resources of such patients are
easily captured by objects on their right-hand side, and
that they seem unable to withdraw (or ‘disengage’) their
attention from objects on the right in order to attend to
the left hemispace [4]. Thus, neglect is generally regarded
as a disorder of attention. We should note, however, that
some patients with neglect show related disturbances in
the domain of action, having difficulty moving their limbs
into the left hemispace (a directional hypokinesia).
There appear to be some attitudinal, or ‘emotional’, factors
that co-occur with the neglect disorder. As in many other
areas of psychology, such matters of affect have received far
less attention. As we shall see, however, these factors are
essential if we are to understand the work of Ramachandran
et al. [1]. Thus, neglect patients frequently appear unaware
of their deficit, even when confronted with direct evidence
of their neglect. They do not attempt to compensate for
their deficit, commonly failing to check for the left half of
objects, and often ‘losing’ objects in the left hemispace. 
In cases of simple hemianopia, where the patient cannot
directly observe objects in the left visual field, patients are
commonly aware that they might be missing objects on that
side. To compensate for this restriction of vision, they gener-
ally swivel their head to the left, to view the ‘previously left’
side of the world with their (intact) right visual field. In con-
trast, many patients with neglect have difficulty even imag-
ining objects in the left hemispace. They seem unaware that
they are missing objects on the left, and might be argued to
be unaware of very existence of a left side of space.
The patients also have an unusual attitude towards their
own body. They are commonly paralysed down the left
side (hemiplegia), but they frequently deny this disability
(anosognosia). When directly asked to move the
(hemiplegic) limb, they might fob the examiner off with an
excuse, such as “I must have tired it out using it earlier”.
And patients with hemispatial neglect sometimes even
experience a profound hatred towards the left side (miso-
plegia [5]). They may personify the left limb, call it names
— the nuisance’ — or physically abuse the left side.
From a strictly cognitive perspective, therefore, these
patients fail to attend to the left side of space, and they
also show some unusual attitudes towards the left. But
investigations of the ‘emotional’ aspects of the deficit have
received far less prominence in the literature. The recent
experiments of Ramachandran et al. [1] offer us an oppor-
tunity to see how far a simple ‘attentional’ account of the
deficit might take us. In these experiments, the patient
was offered an external aid to overcome the purely cogni-
tive difficulties of lateral attention — a mirror was placed
on the right of the patient, and aligned obliquely so that
objects placed on their left side would be reflected to
appear in their ‘good’ visual field. Viewed from the ‘atten-
tional’ perspective, we might perhaps expect the patient
to say “Ah... there the object is. I couldn’t see it before,
because I can’t attend to the left — thanks for reflecting it
across for me”. But the responses of the patients tested by
Ramachandran et al. [1] were entirely different.
The patients not only failed to reach leftwards for the
objects, but they repeatedly banged into the mirror, or
searched behind it, making comments such as “it’s not in
my reach” (though it was) and “it’s behind the mirror”.
One patient claimed that the object was “inside the
mirror”. These bizarre findings are not reports of isolated
incidents. The experiment was carried out (on the four
patients) a total of 28 times, always with the same result,
with similar behaviour continuing for some 20 seconds on
each trial. Though otherwise lucid, the patients seemed
unable to deduce intellectually where the object ought to
be, and hence the way that mirrors ‘work’. These findings
might well be interpreted as providing intriguing evidence
of the attitudes that such patients feel towards the left
hemispace. Thus, their denial of the ‘existence’ of the left
hemispace is so profound that it continues, even when the
purely attentional difficulties of looking left have been
overcome. One interpretation offered by Ramachandran et
al. [1] is that “since the reflection is in the mirror, the pen
must be on my left. But the left does not exist in my
world, therefore it must be inside the mirror”.
Certainly, these findings seem incredible, and doubtless
the sceptical reader has thought of some reasons why
these conclusions might not be justified. Hence — as in
all good single-case neuropsychology — the authors offer
additional details which serve to counter, in advance, any
questions on the part of the doubtful reader. First, as
alluded to above, the patients were not demented,
aphasic or amnesic. Indeed, in an interesting turn of
phrase for a publication from the University of California,
they are described as “quite conversationally fluent (at
least by American standards)”! 
Second, one might wonder whether the patients had failed
to understand the instructions, or recognise the mirror?
Ramachandran et al. [1] make it clear that they specifically
asked each patient what the examiner was holding, and
each correctly named it as a mirror. Each was asked to
describe an object — spectacles, lipstick and so on —
while looking in the mirror, and did so correctly. Third, it
might be argued that the patients did wish to move left,
but that they were unable to do so because of difficulties
moving into the left hemispace (the directional hypokine-
sia discussed above). To counter this, Ramachandran et al.
[1] asked the patients to “point as far to your left as possi-
ble”, which showed that they had more than sufficient
range of movement to reach the objects. They were also
asked to follow instructions such as “touch your left shoul-
der”, which showed that they could accurately direct
actions within the left hemispace (at least in relation to
their body). Note, also, that a hypokinesia-based argument
does not accord with patient descriptions of the objects as
being “behind the mirror” or “inside the mirror”.
Lastly, it might be imagined that, although they could
still name the object as a mirror, they had somehow
forgotten the way in which mirrors ‘work’. To counter
this, Ramachandran et al. [1] repositioned the mirror so
that it lay more-or-less in the coronal plane (facing the
patient). The object was placed above their right shoulder,
with the mirror slightly offset so that patient could view
the object only in the mirror. Thus, the object was placed
within their right (good) hemispace, but out of direct
sight. Under these conditions, three of the four patients
moved directly to the real position of the object from the
very first trial (in the case of a single patient there were a
few initial trials in which the old ‘mirror-banging’ approach
was tried, before they spontaneously moved to pick up the
real object). Thus, although the sceptic might imagine
that the patients had lost the realisation that a mirror offers
a ‘dual representation’ of an object, they made it clear
from their actions that they understood the fact that
mirrors reflect light from a different spatial location, and
that they knew where this location was.
I have only a single objection to the Ramachandran et al. [1]
paper, relating to the title rather than the content. They
suggest a new term for the disorder — ‘mirror agnosia’. The
term ‘agnosia’ is commonly used in neuropsychology, and
refers to a disorder in which the patient has sufficient intel-
lectual and sensory capacities potentially to allow them to
identify an object, and yet they fail to recognise it. Thus, in
prosopagnosia, patients know that they are looking at a face,
but fail to recognise it as the face of, say, Bill Clinton. By
analogy, ‘mirror agnosia’ should be a rather specific disorder
in which the patient sees a flat rectangular object in front of
them, but fails to recognise it as a mirror. Clearly,
Ramachandran et al. [1] did not intend this use of the term.
Is it then a ‘mirror-image agnosia’, in which they see an
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image, but fail to recognise that it comes from a mirror?
This still fails to explain the good performances in cases
where the target object was placed over the right shoulder.
Are we then reduced to the even more cumbersome term
‘hemispatial mirror-image agnosia’? 
Importantly, one might also argue that the disorder of
‘finding the location of objects reflected in mirrors’ is not
the fundamental, or core, deficit in these cases. It seems far
more parsimonious to interpret the bizarre behaviour of
these patients as yet another manifestation of hemispatial
neglect, perhaps not worthy of a specific name. A final
objection is that there is already a disorder of mirror-image
discrimination, quite different to that described above, and
perhaps equally worthy of the term ‘mirror agnosia’. Here,
patients appear to be able to see objects well enough (in
either hemispace), but are unable to discriminate between
mirror-image objects [6–8]. We [8] almost suggested the
term ‘enantiomorphagnosia’ for the deficit of one such
patient — described last year in Current Biology [9] — but
despaired that people would ever learn to pronounce it.
Debates about terminology are not, however, the central
concern of science. Regardless of nomenclature, the
Ramachandran et al. [1] experiments offer a fascinating
insight into the extent to which contradictions within
experience appear to distort our knowledge of the proper-
ties of objects. The impossibility — from the patient’s
perspective — of objects existing on the left leaves them
in the position of having to square this ‘knowledge’ with
their understanding of the properties of mirrors. These
findings raise the question of which kinds of evidence are
required in order to prove existence, perhaps moving such
issues beyond the realm of armchair speculation. In this
vein, Ramachandran et al. [1] suggest the term ‘experi-
mental epistemology’ for this new, scientific, approach to
some ancient philosophical problems. 
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